Skip to main content Sullivan on Comp icon

Sure S. Log

Sure S. Log
Mr. Log, of Counsel, is a specialist in workers' compensation defense and related labor law issues. He analyzes files for litigation and settlement, conducts research, reviews records to facilitate completion of discovery and drafts a variety of documents, including trial and appellate briefs. He was instrumental in a 2009 case that ended vocational rehabilitation in California.
Find me on:

Recent Posts

Special Report: Workers' Compensation Liability For The Coronavirus

Posted by Sure S. Log on Mar 9, 2020 3:51:20 PM

As is now common knowledge, Covid-19, commonly called the "novel coronavirus" or just the "coronavirus," is spreading rapidly across the many parts of the world, including California. Countries around the world are taking dramatic steps to combat the spread of the virus. What does this mean for workers' compensation in California?

Opinions vary as to how severe this threat is, but any controversy aside, steps are being taken. With the number of confirmed cases in California increasing, on March 4, 2020, California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency to slow the spread of coronavirus. Governor Newsom explained the declaration was intended to help California prepare for and contain the spread of the coronavirus by allowing state agencies to more easily procure equipment and services, share information on patients and alleviate restrictions on the use of state-owned properties and facilities.[1]

While governments around the world fight against the spread of the coronavirus, employers in California must also take action to protect their employees against the spread of the disease. Otherwise, they could potentially be liable for injuries or death caused by the virus.

Like the common cold or the flu, the coronavirus would be considered a nonoccupational disease, which is one that is not contracted solely because of an exposure at work or because it is related to a particular type of work. Generally, injuries from nonoccupational diseases are not compensable. As with much of the AOE/COE law in California, however, there are significant exceptions. The law is discussed in depth in Sullivan On Comp Section 5.9 Occupational Disease. A look at the binding case law is in order.

Just catching the disease at work will not be enough in and of itself to establish compensability. The Supreme Court of California explained in Latourette v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 644, 654, that "[I]n the area of nonoccupational disease, '[t]he fact that an employee contracts a disease while employed or becomes disabled from the natural progress of a nonindustrial disease during employment will not establish the causal connection.'" The court explained, "The narrower rule applicable to infectious diseases arises from the obvious problems of determining causation when the source of injury is of uncertain etiology, the product of invisible and often widespread viral, bacterial, or other pathological organisms. The potentially high costs of avoidance and treatment for infectious diseases, coupled with the fact that such illnesses often cannot be shown with certainty to have resulted from exposure in the workplace, also explain the different line-drawing by our courts in the area of nonoccupational disease." (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to the general rule of noncompensability for nonoccupational disease. An injury resulting from a nonoccupational disease may be compensable if:

1) The employment subjects the employee to an increased risk compared to that of the general public; or

2) The immediate cause of the injury is an intervening human agency or instrumentality of the employment.

The first exception is exemplified by the case of Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Acci. Com. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 742. In that case, employees working in shipyards contracted the contagious eye disease known as kerato conjunctivitis. Although there was evidence the disease was also epidemic in San Francisco, the Supreme Court found the evidence "quite convincing that the disease in the community outside of the shipyards was of much less proportion compared to the population." It found "the epidemic in the shipyards constituted a special exposure in excess of that of the commonalty." (Id. at pp. 749-750.) Therefore, the Supreme Court found evidence that the employees' risk of contracting the disease by virtue of the employment was materially greater than that of the general public and affirmed a decision finding the employees' claims compensable.

Thus, if an employee could demonstrate that he or she had a greater risk of exposure at the workplace compared to that of the general public, the courts could find an employee's exposure to the coronavirus compensable. Per Bethlehem Steel, this could be established if the evidence establishes a greater proportion of the employees at the worksite were exposed than the general population such that they were subject to special exposure. If an office or worksite has a higher percentage of coronavirus cases than the general public, then that employer could be liable for injuries or deaths related to the virus.

Another example of the first exception is illustrated by the case of Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Com. (Ehrhardt) (1942) 19 Cal.2d 622. There, the California Supreme Court awarded compensation benefits to a traveling salesman who contracted a respiratory illness caused by a mold or fungus that exists in California's San Joaquin Valley and in Arizona, commonly known as San Joaquin Valley fever. Before his employment, the salesman had never been to either region. The court stated, "It was by reason of and incident to his employment that he came in contact with the infection. The risk to which he was subjected by his employment was not the same as that of the public in the endemic area inasmuch as the great majority of the inhabitants there possessed an immunity to the disease which [the employee], living outside the area, lacked." (Id. at p. 630.)

Therefore, if the employment places an employee in a position of greater risk to the coronavirus than the general public, the courts could also find an employee's exposure to the coronavirus compensable. Doctors, nurses, or other health care workers, who are required to treat patients with the coronavirus could potentially file their own workers' compensation claim if they contract the virus. Moreover, employees who are required to work in close proximity to large numbers of people could argue they are subject to an increased risk compared to that of the general public.

The second exception is exemplified by the case of Maher v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729. In that case, a nurse's assistant had pre-existing tuberculosis, which she was required to treat to continue working. While undergoing treatment, she developed a significant adverse reaction to the drugs, and she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on the disability she sustained as a result of her treatment for tuberculosis. The Supreme Court held that an injury caused by employer-required medical treatment for a preexisting, nonindustrial injury is compensable. (Id. at p. 738.)

So, even if the employee cannot establish the coronavirus occurred at work, or even if it was established the infection occurred outside of the employment, per Maher, the employer could be liable if the employment aggravated the condition. This is because of the long-established rule that "an employer takes the employee as he finds him at the time of the employment." (Ballard v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 3 Cal.3d 832, 837.) If the coronavirus causes the death of an employee, the death may be compensable so long as the employment was a contributing cause. (See South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291.)

Thus, not only should employers take actions to protect the employees from contracting the coronavirus, they should take actions to make sure that employees who are potentially infected with the virus do not aggravate their conditions at work. The precise actions that need to be taken will vary depending on the nature and needs of the business.

Many businesses are already allowing their employees to work from home. Of course, this is not possible for many businesses and employees. For those who cannot work at home, it goes without saying that employees who are sick should not be permitted to work, particularly if they work with the public. Attendance to what preventative measures may be taken, such as hand sanitizers and the like, or limitations on physical forms of contact, seem to be good ideas. Many employers are withdrawing their employees from public gatherings, such as conventions or meetings, and some are restricting business travel. Whether this sort of thing is necessary or when it may become necessary is a choice each business must make, in light of the overall health and well being of the employees and the business itself. Accordingly, close awareness of the progression of the disease is warranted.

1)  Karlamangla, S. et al. (2020, March 6) A Grand Princess cruise ship was at center of coronavirus fight amid concerns about spread. Retrieved from

Topics: Events

Urgent Report - Skelton v. WCAB: No Temporary Disability While Attending Medical Treatment Appointments

Posted by Sure S. Log on Sep 17, 2019 3:20:00 PM

A California Court of Appeal ruling this month held that an industrially injured employee may not receive temporary disability benefits when he or she takes time off from work to attend medical treatment appointments.


Labor Code 4600(e)(1) states, "When at the request of the employer, the employer’s insurer, the administrative director, the appeals board, or a workers’ compensation administrative law judge, the employee submits to examination by a physician, he or she shall be entitled to receive, in addition to all other benefits herein provided, ... one day of temporary disability indemnity for each day of wages lost in submitting to the examination."

In Department of Rehabilitation v. WCAB (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 1281, 1295. the California Supreme Court explained that "this benefit is in the nature of a medical-legal benefit, reimbursing the employee for his time when requested to submit to a medical examination to resolve a compensation claim." So, although § 4600 generally relates to medical treatment, the Supreme Court interpreted the benefit in § 4600(e)(1) as relating to medical-legal expenses.

In that case, the Supreme Court held that an employee was not entitled to temporary disability benefits while pursuing medical treatment for a permanent and stationary injury. It also held that the employer did not discriminate against the employee within the meaning of § 132a by requiring the employee to use sick leave and vacation leave when he was away from the workplace seeking treatment for his permanent injury.

The Supreme Court, however, did not specifically address whether an employee was entitled to temporary disability benefits for missing work to attend medical appointments before permanent and stationary status. Although the WCAB confronted the issue in one case,[1] for 16 years after Lauher there was no binding authority.

Then, on Sept. 5, 2019, the 6th District Court of Appeal in Skelton v. WCAB [2] held that an employee was not entitled to temporary disability indemnity arising from time off work to attend medical treatment appointments.


In Skelton, an employee filed claims for two separate injuries. She was placed on modified work and continued working after each injury. Her work hours were not flexible, and she could not visit her doctors on weekends. She initially used her sick and vacation leave, but eventually her paycheck was reduced for missed time at work.

The employee sought reimbursement for her wage loss to attend medical treatment and medical-legal evaluations. The WCAB concluded that pursuant to § 4600(e)(1) and Lauher, the employee was entitled to one day of temporary disability indemnity for each day of wage loss in submitting to a medical-legal evaluation, but not for a medical treatment appointment. This decision was upheld by the appellate court.


Subscribe to Sullivan on Comp



Citing other cases, the 6th District Court of Appeal explained, "The purpose of temporary disability indemnity is to provide interim wage replacement assistance to an injured worker during the period of time he or she is healing and incapable of working" (emphasis added). In addition, "The employer’s obligation to pay temporary disability benefits is tied to the employee’s actual incapacity to perform the tasks usually encountered in one’s employment and the wage loss resulting therefrom" (emphasis added). In that case, the court found that the employee returned to work full time after her injuries and subsequently took time off from work because she could not schedule medical treatment during nonwork hours. It found that neither the employee's time off from work nor her wage loss were due to an incapacity to work. Instead, they were due to scheduling issues and her employer’s leave policy. The court concluded that because the employee's injuries did not render her incapable of working during the time she took off from work and suffered wage loss, she was not entitled to temporary disability indemnity for that time off or wage loss.

The case originally was issued as an unpublished decision on Sept. 5, 2019, but on Sept. 16, 2019, the court ordered publication of the case.


It is well-established that employers are generally liable for any subsequent injuries that are a compensable consequence of the original industrial injury. As a result, injured employees often feel that employers should be liable for any and all consequences of an industrial injury.

In Lauher, however, the Supreme Court held that employees were not entitled to temporary disability benefits or wage loss while pursuing medical treatment after becoming permanent and stationary. Now, in Skelton, the 6th District Court of Appeal has held that employees are not entitled to those benefits while pursuing medical treatment after returning to work, even if they are not yet permanent and stationary.

Both Lauher and Skelton explained that the workers' compensation system does not provide a make-whole remedy, and that in exchange for the blanket coverage of compensation without regard to fault, the employee bears some of the burden. So, employees aren't entitled to any and all loses as a result of an industrial injury –– they are expected to suffer some loss as a result of an industrial injury.

Accordingly, employees are not entitled to schedule medical treatment appointments for an industrial injury during working hours. If an appointment is scheduled during that time, an employer does not necessarily violate the Labor Code by requiring an industrially injured employee to use sick and vacation leave to attend the appointment. And, if an employee does not have any sick and vacation leave, he or she may be required to forgo any payment to attend the medical treatment appointment.


  1. SeeWard v. WCAB(2004) 69 CCC 1179 (writ denied).

  2. 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 874

Topics: Press Releases

Liability for the Supplemental Job Displacement Benefit

Posted by Sure S. Log on May 23, 2019 3:13:45 PM

For injuries occurring on or after Jan. 1, 2004, an employee who suffers residual effects from an injury and is unable to return to work is entitled to a supplemental job displacement benefit. The benefit comes in the form of a nontransferable voucher, and often is referred to by practitioners simply as the "voucher."

Prior to 2013, an employer was liable for the voucher if it did not offer permanent, modified or alternative work meeting certain requirements within 30 days of the termination of temporary disability indemnity payments. Because of the statutory limits on temporary disability, it was not uncommon for temporary disability payments to end even before an employee was deemed to be permanent and stationary. So, as part of SB 863, the California Legislature changed the point at which the benefit is triggered.

For injuries on or after Jan. 1, 2013, in order to avoid liability for the voucher, Labor Code 4658.7(b)(1) requires an employer to offer regular, modified or alternative work "no later than 60 days after receipt by the claims administrator of the first report received from either the primary treating physician, an agreed medical evaluator, or a qualified medical evaluator, in the form created by the administrative director ..., finding that the disability from all conditions for which compensation is claimed has become permanent and stationary and that the injury has caused permanent partial disability" (emphasis added).

The Legislature considered the "form created by the administrative director" to be a "mandatory attachment to a medical report to be forwarded to the employer ... for the purpose of fully informing the employer of work capabilities and of activity restrictions resulting from the injury that are relevant to potential regular work, modified work, or alternative work" (LC 4658.7(h)(2)).

Accordingly, the administrative director adopted California Code of Regulations, Title 8, 10133.31; subsection (b) specifies that an employer's duty to offer regular, modified or alternative work is "no later than 60 days after receipt by the claims administrator of the Physician's Return to Work & Voucher report (Form DWC-AD 10133.36) ...." The Physician's Return-to-Work & Voucher Report (RTW Report) requires a physician to specify an injured employee's work restrictions. It also allows physicians to consider a job description and specify whether an employee's work capacity is compatible with the physical requirements of the job. It is intended to make it easier for employers to determine when they should begin investigating whether work is available to an injured worker and clearly delineate the work restrictions that must be considered.

Although the RTW Report was adopted effective Jan. 1, 2014, physicians still frequently fail to complete the form. It is not uncommon for an injured worker to be declared permanent and stationary without the form being completed by any physician. Accordingly, if an employer's duty to investigate liability for the voucher is never triggered, can an employer be liable for the voucher?

In Fndkyan v. Opus One Labs, 2019 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 51, the WCAB held that it could. The WCAB recognized that the RTW Report is described by § 4658.7(h)(2) as a "mandatory attachment" to a medical report. In that case, however, it was undisputed that the defendant received the QME report, which informed the defendant that the applicant was permanent and stationary and of the applicant's work capabilities and restrictions. The WCAB determined that because the QME report provided the information required by the RTW Report, it would "place form over substance" to require the RTW Report. So, even though it was undisputed that there was no evidence that the RTW Report was sent to or received by the defendant, the WCAB concluded that the applicant was entitled to the voucher.

The WCAB's decision can still be challenged to the extent that the Labor Code and administrative regulations specify that an employer's liability for the voucher is triggered by receipt of the RTW Report. In Honeywell v. WCAB (Wagner) (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 24, the California Supreme Court explained that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the WCAB may not depart from it. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the 90-day investigation period starts on receipt of the filing of the claim form per § 5402(b), based on the clear statutory language, not on the employer's knowledge of the injury. Accordingly, because § 4658.7(b)(1) specifies that the 60-day period starts on receipt of the RTW Report, employers may argue that liability for the voucher also doesn't begin until they receive the RTW Report.

But it must be considered that CCR § 10109(a) requires a claims administrator to "conduct a reasonable and timely investigation upon receiving notice or knowledge of an injury or claim for workers' compensation benefits." Subsection (b) specifies, "A reasonable investigation must attempt to obtain the information needed to determine and timely provide each benefit, if any, which may be due the employee." So if an employer receives information that an employee may be entitled to the voucher, it must attempt to obtain information needed to determine whether the voucher must be provided.

Accordingly, if an employer receives a permanent and stationary report from a physician, but the physician does not complete a RTW Report, the employer may request one if it does not believe it has enough information to determine whether permanent, modified or alternative work is available. On receipt of the RTW Report, the employer would then have 60 days to make an offer of work. But, if an employer receives the necessary information to make an offer of work, even if it is not on the required form, it cannot avoid liability for the voucher by its own inaction.

Topics: Press Releases

Are Saturdays Business Days for the Purposes of Utilization Review?

Posted by Sure S. Log on May 23, 2019 2:59:39 PM

Since 2004, an employer is required to conduct a utilization review (UR) in order to dispute a request for medical treatment. Under the current law, if an injured worker challenges a UR determination to deny or modify a request for treatment, the worker must request an independent medical review (IMR) from an organization contracted by the administrative director. If, however, the UR determination is untimely, it is not subject to an IMR. Instead, the determination of medical necessity may be made by the WCAB. (Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (2014) 79 CCC 1298 (WCAB en banc).) So, it's crucial for employers to conduct their URs in a timely manner.

Labor Code 4610(i)(1) states that an employer must make a UR determination with "five working days from the receipt of a request for authorization for medical treatment." It extends this time to 14 calendar days if additional information is required. The employer still must request the additional information from the treating physician within five business days of receipt of the request for authorization. (California Code of Regulations Title 8, 9792.9.1(f)(2)(A).)

Since the inception of the UR process, employers generally have understood the "five working day" limit in § 4610(i)(1) to exclude weekends and holidays. Recently, however, injured workers (or, more specifically, their attorneys) have started arguing that Saturdays constitute business days for the purposes of UR.

To support their argument, injured workers cite the case of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole and Community Services v. WCAB (Gomez) (2018) 83 CCC 530 (writ denied). That case did not hold that Saturdays were working days. It held only that the Friday after Thanksgiving was a working day. The WCAB, however, also concluded that "working day" and "business day" have the same meaning, and the provisions of LC 4600.4 control the determination of whether a day is a normal business day for the purposes of UR decisions.

The 4th District Court of Appeal did not grant the defendant's petition for writ of review. But, in denying review, it agreed that § 4600.4 was applicable to UR determinations. LC 4600.4(b) states, "For the purposes of this section 'normal business day' means a business day as defined in Section 9 of the Civil Code." The court stated, "The Civil Code, in turn, defines a 'business day' as every day other than 'every Sunday and such other days as are specified or provided for as holidays in the Government Code of the State of California.'" The court rejected the defendant's argument that holidays observed by the WCAB were excluded, stating, "The holidays observed by the WCAB and California courts are not holidays for the state as a whole. There is no indication the Labor Code intended to exclude these holidays from its definition of 'working days' for the purposes of the UR process."

These statements have fueled the argument that Saturdays are business days for the purposes of UR. But again, Gomez did not specifically address the issue. Because the 4th District Court of Appeal denied review, Gomez is not binding, and several arguments can be made against counting Saturdays as business days.

One: Although Civil Code 9 states, "All other days than those mentioned in Section 7 are business days for all purposes," it adds that "as to any act appointed by law or contract, or in any other way, to be performed by, at, or through any bank organized under the laws of or doing business in this state, any optional bank holiday as defined in Section 7.1 is not a business day" (emphasis added). Civil Code 7.1 states that optional bank holidays include "every Saturday."

If Civil Code 7.1 applies to UR determinations, Saturdays would not be business days for the purposes of UR. If it does not, Saturdays could be considered business days. But if the Legislature intended to define "working days" by only Civil Code 7, it could have referred specifically to that section. Instead, it refers to § 9, which also discusses § 7.1. So, arguably optional bank holidays, including Saturdays, are not business days.

Two: CCR 10508 states, "If the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day." The regulation contemplates that Saturdays are not considered business days in the workers' compensation system.

Three: The DIR gives clear instructions to claims administrators on its website that Saturdays are not business days. The website states: "Saturday and Sunday are not counted as business days, and therefore receipt of requests on a weekend or a holiday does not count as a receipt, until the next business day." It also states, "When counting business days, the Saturday, Sunday or holiday is not counted as a business day, so continue the count on the next business day. Whenever the last day in counting a calendar day deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the count moves to the next day."[1]

Finally, the WCAB repeatedly has stated that business days do not include Saturdays or Sundays. (See for example, Binger v. Integrated Office Systems, 2009 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 406; Castrillo v. Catholic Health Care West dba Marian Medical Center,2012 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 454; Shanley v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 2014 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 660; Tolliver v. County of Fresno, 2015 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 645; Sephers v. Stanislaus County Fairgrounds, 2017 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 297.) None of the cases, however, specifically considered the issue or application of LC 4600.4.

So, although employers have strong arguments against it, the issue is open as to whether Saturdays are working days for the purposes of UR. If the WCAB determines that Saturdays are working days, it would have significant consequences in the workers' compensation system. Potentially thousands of UR determinations could be deemed untimely. Substantial litigation on this issue continues, and it's reasonable to expect the WCAB to issue a definitive opinion.

Accordingly, if an employer seeks review of this issue before the WCAB, it would be prudent to ask that if the appeals board were to find that Saturday is a working day, the WCAB should apply its decision only prospectively. The Supreme Court has explained, "Although as a general rule judicial decisions are to be given retroactive effect [citation], there is a recognized exception when a judicial decision changes a settled rule on which the parties below have relied. Considerations of fairness and public policy may require that a decision be given only prospective application." (Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 367, 378, citations omitted.)

Given that the DIR website and past decisions from the WCAB have instructed that Saturdays are not working days for the purposes of UR, it would be fundamentally unfair to invalidate prior UR decisions. So, employers should assert that any determination that Saturday is a working day should apply only prospectively.

Topics: Case Law Updates

URGENT REPORT: Villanueva v. Teva Foods: Control by Criminally Charged Provider for the Purposes of LC 4615 Stay

Posted by Sure S. Log on Mar 11, 2019 10:05:30 AM

tevaIn 2016, the California Legislature passed two bills to combat workers' compensation fraud, AB 1244 and SB 1160. As a result of this legislation, per LC 4615, any lien and any accrual of interest related to the lien, are automatically stayed on the filing of criminal charges against a physician or provider for an offense involving fraud against the workers’ compensation system, medical billing fraud, insurance fraud or fraud against the Medicare or Medi-Cal programs.

LC 4615 originally had limited application because the WCAB held that the filing of criminal charges against a physician did not necessarily result in a stay of liens for an entire medical group.[1] So, in 2017, the Legislature passed AB 1422 to clean up this loophole.

Now, LC 4615(a)(1) also applies to "any entity controlled" by a criminally charged physician, practitioner or provider. LC 139.21(a)(3) states that "an entity is controlled by an individual if the individual is an officer or a director of the entity, or a shareholder with a 10 percent or greater interest in the entity." So the LC 4615 lien stay applies not only to liens filed directly by criminally charged providers, but also to entities over which they have control.

Subscribe to Sullivan on Comp

Nevertheless, it has been difficult to stay liens filed by entities. The WCAB has held that a defendant bears the burden of proving that an entity is controlled by a criminally charged provider for the purposes of an LC 4615 stay. It has held that being on the Department of Industrial Relations' list of liens potentially subject to a stay under LC 4615[2]does not automatically require a stay. So the WCAB generally has declined to impose a stay on an entity unless a defendant establishes control as defined by LC 139.21(a)(3).[3]

On March 8, 2019, the WCAB expanded the grounds on which a defendant could establish that an entity is controlled by a criminally charged provider. In Villanueva v. Teva Foods (2019) ADJ9332041, the WCAB issued a significant panel decision holding that control under LC 139.21(a)(3) may be established with admissible evidence that the physician, practitioner or provider charged with a crime: (1) is or was an "officer or a director" of the entity; (2) is or was "a shareholder with a 10 percent or greater interest" in the entity; or (3) held de facto ownership of the entity or de facto control consistent with the rights and duties of an officer or director of the entity.

In that case, it was alleged that criminally charged providers Dr. Munir Uwaydah and Paul Turley controlled Firstline Health, Inc. (Firstline), and therefore, Firstline's liens were subject to a stay under LC 4615. Firstline, however, contended that as of Oct. 11, 2010, Dr. David Johnson was the sole owner of Firstline, and because Dr. Johnson was not charged with any crime, there were no grounds to impose an LC 4615 stay.

On the date of trial, the defendant introduced a signed declaration under penalty of perjury from Paul Turley (Turley Statement) indicating: (1) Dr. Uwaydah owned and controlled many companies and properties, including Firstline, even though other individuals were listed as the owners or they were supposedly corporations with managing board members; (2) this was all done intentionally so that Dr. Uwaydah could hide his ownership and his control from creditors, insurance investigators, government agencies and law enforcement; and (3) Dr. Uwaydah exercised absolute control over many companies, which included Firstline.

The WCAB found the Turley Statement admissible because it was not created until after the settlement conference. It also found that the statement established prima-facie grounds to impose an LC 4615 stay against Firstline's liens. But because the lien claimant was not served with the Turley Statement until the day before trial, the WCAB found that Firstline did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to rebut the Turley Statement. The matter was remanded to the trial level for further proceedings.

Villanueva's holding that control may be established by showing that a criminally charged provider had de facto ownership or control of an entity goes beyond the definition of "control" in LC 139.21(a)(3). The WCAB obviously felt it was necessary to stay liens when providers intentionally tried to hide their control of an entity in order to avoid consequences from law enforcement. It did not believe that criminally charged providers should be shielded from LC 4615 by their illegal efforts to conceal their control over an entity.

Villanueva doesn't necessarily make it easier for defendants to prove that an entity is controlled by a criminally charged provider. In that case, the defendant obtained a statement from Paul Turley that was made as part of a plea arrangement in a criminal case. It is difficult to imagine insurers and claims administrators normally being able to obtain such evidence on their own.

Nevertheless, if such evidence is obtained by a defendant, Villanueva requires it to be considered in determining whether an entity is controlled by a criminally charged provider, and thus whether the entity's liens should be stayed pursuant to LC 4615.


  1.  See e.g., Enciso v. Toys "R" Us (2017) 82 CCC 1059 (panel decision).
  2.  See
  3.  See e.g., Ayala v. Santa Monica Beach Club, 2018 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 567; Sanchez v. A to Z Home Repair, Inc., 2018 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 51.

Topics: Announcements